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Interest Groups and Criminal Behavior

LAURA ANN WILSON

The fundamental origins of legal codes are little understood. According to pluralists, laws are beneficial public goods that evolve from open political competition. An economic model sees laws as the product of selfish motivations and illegitimate lobbying pressures. These models make conflicting predictions about the role that interest groups play in promoting respect for law and the general level of criminal activity. When other obvious factors are controlled, we find that states with many interest groups have a higher level of personal crime, but a lower level of property crime. These findings suggest that the different political cultures which exist in the United States are related to how people act cooperatively and competitively in society. The findings also suggest that we should rethink our theories about the role that conflict and cooperation play in affecting popular support for legal systems.

Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, Vol. 28, No. 2, 157-173 (1991)
DOI: 10.1177/0022427891028002003


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